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Abstract 
Conflict adaptation is one of the most popular ideas in cognitive psychology. It purports to 
explain a wide range of data, including both brain and behavioural data from the proportion 
congruent and Gratton paradigms. However, in recent years many concerns about the viability of 
this account have been raised. It has been argued that contingency learning, not conflict 
adaptation, produces the proportion congruent effect. Similarly, the Gratton paradigm has been 
shown to contain several confounds, most notably feature repetition biases. Newer work on 
temporal learning further questions the interpretability of the behavioural results of conflict 
adaptation studies. Brain data linking supposed conflict adaptation to the anterior cingulated 
cortex (ACC) has also come into question, as this area seems to be solely responsive to time-on-
task rather than conflict. This review points to the possibility that conflict adaptation may simply 
be an illusion. However, the extant data remain ambiguous and there are a lot of open questions 
that still need to be addressed in future research. 
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Questioning Conflict Adaptation: Proportion Congruent and Gratton Effects Reconsidered 
 The role of cognitive control in basic mental functions is one of the primary questions of 
interest for cognitive psychologists. One of the most popular ideas in the literature is conflict 
adaptation, the idea that we deal with conflict between stimuli in our environment by shifting 
attention away from the source of conflict and toward the stimulus we wish to process. The 
Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935) offers the most common way of studying conflict adaptation. In 
this task, participants identify the print colour of a colour word. Response times and error rates 
are increased to incongruent stimuli (e.g., the word BLUE printed in red; BLUEred) relative to 
congruent stimuli (e.g., BLUEblue). Other commonly used paradigms included the Eriksen flanker 
task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), in which congruent or incongruent distracting letters (or words) 
are presented on either side of a centrally-located target letter (or word); and the Simon task 
(Simon & Rudell, 1967), in which a distracting stimulus location is either congruent or 
incongruent with the response that needs to be made to the target (e.g., a left keypress for a 
stimulus on the right side of the screen). In paradigms such as these, evidence for conflict 
adaptation comes from the observation that the size of the congruency effect can be altered in 
response to changes in conflict. In particular, this paper discusses the proportion congruent and 
Gratton paradigms. 
 Conflict adaptation theory has a lot of explanatory power. However, the goal of this paper 
is to explore whether or not conflict adaptation must be assumed in order to explain such 
phenomena as the proportion congruent and Gratton effects. Some of the mounting evidence 
against the highly popular conflict adaptation account will be discussed and it will be argued that 
simpler, non-conflict learning and memory processes can just as easily explain the extant results. 
The paper will begin by discussing proportion congruent effects. This section will discuss a 
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contingency learning account of item-specific learning effects. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the role of temporal learning biases in list-level learning effects. Finally, a 
compound-cue contingency learning and temporal learning account of context-level learning will 
be presented. The following section will turn to the Gratton paradigm, where the role of stimulus 
binding and contingency learning biases will be highlighted. The next section discusses the brain 
data that is often used to argue for conflict adaptation and the problems in interpreting such data 
will be highlighted. Overall, this paper will argue that, although highly intuitive and seemingly 
able to explain a wide range of data, conflict adaptation may not actually exist. Learning and 
memory biases might instead provide a sufficient account. However, there are a lot of open 
questions that still need answers before it can be conclusively determined whether or not conflict 
adaptation does exist. In this vein, the final section of the paper will discuss possible future 
directions. 
Proportion Congruent 
 In the context of a Stroop or similar paradigm, the proportion congruent (PC) effect is the 
observation that congruency effects are larger with a higher proportion of congruent to 
incongruent trials (Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). For instance, if 75% of the stimuli are congruent and 
only 25% are incongruent, then the congruency effect (i.e., incongruent – congruent) will be 
quite large. In contrast, if only 25% of the stimuli are congruent and 75% are incongruent, then 
the congruency effect will be quite small. The proportion congruent effect is normally interpreted 
as evidence for conflict adaptation (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). Specifically, the claim is that when the 
proportion of congruent trials is low, participants detect that the word generally interferes with 
processing of the colour, so they decrease attention to the word. Because they attend less to the 
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word, it has less impact on performance. Thus, a smaller difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials is observed. In contrast, when most of the trials are congruent, participants detect 
that conflict is infrequent and thus allow attention to the word. Thus, the conflict effect is larger. 
In short, the conflict adaptation account assumes that participants are able to learn about the 
proportion of conflict trials and are then able to shift their attentional strategy in response to this. 
 In the computational model of Botvinick and colleagues (2001) this learning is achieved 
by a conflict monitoring mechanism. This mechanism measures the level of conflict that occurs 
on each trial and then the cognitive system uses this conflict information to adjust attention (i.e., 
conflict adaptation). Over the course of an experiment information about conflict can 
accumulate. Thus, in a low PC task a very large amount of conflict has been encountered on 
previous trials. Conflict adaptation is therefore increased to reduce the impact of the distracting 
word on colour identification. In contrast, in a high PC task conflict occurs much less frequently 
and thus conflict adaptation is decreased. Via these mechanisms, the conflict monitoring model 
was able to simulate the proportion congruent effect. This model is also able to account for other 
results (e.g., the Gratton effect), as will be discussed in later sections of this review. 
Item-Specific Proportion Congruent 
 The conflict adaptation account of PC effects has subjective appeal, because it seems 
straightforward and plausible. However, some recent work has provided several difficulties for 
the conflict adaptation account. One particularly problematic finding is the observation that PC 
effects are strongly determined by item-specific pairings. For instance, Jacoby, Lindsay, and 
Hessels (2003) manipulated proportion congruency at the item level. Specifically, some words 
were presented most often in their congruent colour (high PC items; e.g., BLUEblue) and other 
words were presented most often in an incongruent colour (low PC items; e.g., REDorange). High 
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and low PC items were intermixed, thus making it impossible for participants to know whether a 
given trial would be a high or low PC item in advance. In other words, learning that the word 
tends to conflict or tends not to conflict in the task as a whole (i.e., list-level conflict adaptation, 
which I will return to later) was impossible. Despite this fact, participants produced an item-
specific proportion congruent (ISPC) effect: congruency effects were larger for high PC items 
than for low PC items. 
 The more traditional idea that conflict adaptation occurs as a reaction to the general 
frequency of conflict in the task as a whole obviously cannot explain item-specific differences in 
conflict effects. This includes the Botvinick and colleagues (2001) conflict monitoring model, as 
this model also relies on conflict information recorded across the task as a whole. Some have 
proposed, however, that conflict monitoring and adaptation might occur in a more flexible and 
item-specific manner. For instance, Blais, Robidoux, Risko, and Besner (2007) present a variant 
of the conflict monitoring computational model in which attention is flexibly modulated for each 
word. In other words, the model keeps track of the level of conflict associated with each 
distracting word, rather than the level of conflict associated with the task as a whole. As a result, 
presentation of a high PC word (e.g., BLUE) will lead to weaker conflict adaptation than will 
presentation of a low PC word (e.g., RED). Such a model was therefore able to simulate ISPC 
effects. 
 There is a logical problem with this approach, however, because it is not clear how the 
cognitive system can know whether a given word is high or low PC until it has already been 
identified. In other words, the system cannot know whether or not it should (high PC) or should 
not (low PC) attend to the word until the word has already been identified. The computational 
model knows this in advance, but it is impossible for a real cognitive system to know this. Given 
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this problem, another approach was subsequently presented by Verguts and Notebaert (2008) in 
which conflict modulates learning. In this model, conflict is a signal to increase Hebbian 
learning. For low PC items, frequent conflict leads to a stronger connection between the colour 
node and the colour task demand unit, which then increases in top-down influence to reduce 
conflict. In a sense, this model, too, uses information about which stimulus is presented in order 
to determine whether or not to attend to it (i.e., the degree to which the task demand unit favours 
identification of the target depends on the identity of the target). To what extent this makes sense 
is not clear, but such models are capable of producing ISPC effects by assuming that conflict 
adaptation is highly flexible and rapid. 
 Contingency learning. While flexible conflict adaptation models can provide an 
explanation for ISPC effects, such effects are easily interpretable in terms of a very different 
process than conflict adaptation: contingency learning. Schmidt and colleagues (Schmidt, in 
press; Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, and Besner, 2007; see also, 
Mordkoff, 1996) argue that the reason for larger Stroop effects for high relative to low PC items 
has to do with the predictability of the response based on the identity of the word. For high PC 
items, the word is predictive of the congruent response. For instance, if BLUE is presented most 
often in blue, then BLUE is predictive of a blue response. This will lead participants to respond 
faster than normal to congruent trials, thus increasing the difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials. In sharp contrast, for low PC items the word is predictive of an incongruent 
response (e.g., RED is predictive of an orange response). This will lead participants to respond 
faster than normal to incongruent trials, thus decreasing the difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials. These contingency biases therefore confound PC experiments and are capable 
of producing a PC effect on their own. Conflict adaptation does not have to be assumed. 
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 Schmidt and Besner (2008) further decomposed the ISPC effect and showed that, indeed, 
the effect is specifically driven by a speeding of those trials in which the word accurately 
predicts the correct response. They further argued that the basic congruency effect and the 
contingency learning biases are the result of two entirely different sets of processes. Because of 
this independence, they suggested that congruency and contingency effects would not interact 
with each other. Support of this notion came with the observation that contingency learning and 
congruency effects are additive. While this additive pattern has been observed elsewhere (e.g., 
Atalay & Misirlisoy, 2012), deviations from additivity are also sometimes observed (e.g., Blais 
& Bunge, 2010; Bugg, Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011). For instance, in a word-picture Stroop task, 
Bugg and colleagues observed that incongruent trials were more influenced by item PC (and thus 
contingency) than congruent trials. In other words, the difference between high PC and low PC 
incongruent trials was larger than the difference between high PC and low PC congruent trials. 
 Although such results were taken as evidence against the contingency account of PC 
effects, the additivity assumptions of Schmidt and Besner (2008) can be regarded as “just so” 
properties of the early version of the contingency account. In other words, Schmidt and Besner 
argued that contingency and congruency should be additive, but this is not a necessary 
conclusion from the idea that PC effects are driven by contingency learning. Even if congruency 
and contingency effects are driven by independent processes, an interaction can still result from 
the cascading of one process into another. Indeed, subsequent modelling work of Schmidt (in 
press) has shown that pure additivity is highly unlikely. The conceptual reason for this is that 
there is an overall difference in reaction time between incongruent and congruent trials. As a 
result, contingency biases have more time to affect the results on incongruent trials than on 
congruent trials. Simulations with the contingency learning model of Schmidt produced an 
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interaction between contingency and congruency of exactly this form (viz., a greater effect of PC 
on incongruent relative to congruent trials). Although additive patterns are still extremely 
difficult to interpret in terms of conflict adaptation, interpretations of deviations from additivity 
do not necessarily support conflict adaptation. In other words, an overadditive interaction (e.g., 
such as the one of Bugg et al., 2011) does not logically falsify the contingency learning account. 
 Because non-additive relationships between contingency and congruency are sometimes 
observed, Schmidt (in press) developed a new way of distinguishing between conflict adaptation 
and contingency learning. Specifically, the contingencies in the task were manipulated such that 
conflict adaptation and contingency learning could be dissociated. This was accomplished by 
generating three types of incongruent trials: (1) low proportion congruent and high contingency 
(e.g., GREENred, where GREEN is presented mostly in red), (2) low proportion congruent and 
low contingency (e.g., YELLOWred, where YELLOW is presented mostly in green), and (3) high 
proportion congruent and low contingency (e.g., BLUEred, where BLUE is presented mostly in 
blue). The first two types of incongruent trials did not vary in proportion congruency (both low 
PC), but did vary in contingency (high vs. low). Comparison of the two revealed significant 
contingency learning effects. In contrast, the last two types of incongruent trials did not vary in 
contingency (both low contingency), but did vary in item PC (high vs. low). Comparison of the 
two revealed no evidence of conflict adaptation. Further, comparisons between items that did not 
vary in contingency or the item PC associated with the distracting word, but did vary in the item 
PC associated with the target colour (high vs. low) also failed to produce evidence for conflict 
adaptation. As a whole, such results demonstrated sizeable effects of contingency learning with 
no hint of a contribution of conflict adaptation effects. Although failure to observe conflict 
adaptation does not logically entail that (item-specific) conflict adaptation does not exist ever, it 
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does raise the suspicion. 
 In contrast to Schmidt (in press), Bugg and colleagues (2011) claim to show an effect of 
proportion congruency where contingency learning is impossible. In picture-word Stroop, they 
manipulated their task to maximize attention to the target picture rather than the distracting word, 
with the rationale that this would minimize the effectiveness of contingency information that 
normally dominates ISPC effects, thus allowing conflict adaptation to have a stronger effect. In 
their Experiment 2, high PC incongruent items are compared with low PC incongruent items. 
High PC incongruent items were responded to slower than low PC incongruent items, consistent 
with conflict adaptation predictions. Because the experiment put a processing bias on the target 
picture rather than the distracting word, the authors argue that high and low PC incongruent 
items vary in PC associated with the target, but do not vary in contingency associated with the 
target (i.e., targets are 100% predictive of the response, irrespective of condition). However, this 
reasoning is faulted. The contingency account argues that participants use distracting 
information to anticipate the response to the target. In these experiments, the distracters in the 
low PC incongruent condition had a higher contingency (18.75% or 37.5%, depending on the 
word) than in the high PC incongruent condition (6.25% or 12.5%). Thus, the contingency 
account should expect faster responses to the low PC relative to high PC incongruent items, as 
observed. There are further difficulties in interpreting any of the results of this experiment, 
because the frequency of the different distracters was not equated: high PC words were presented 
overall twice as frequently as low PC words. It is not entirely clear how this atypical stimulus 
frequency bias may have affected any of the key observations in the experiment (e.g., an overall 
item- or category-level expectancy, or conversely item- or category-level habituation). It is 
ambiguous whether the pattern of results observed in this experiment and the subsequent one 
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(where bias is shifted to the distracting word) are due to the changes in the contingency and 
stimulus frequency matrix or to conflict adaptation. Overall, the combined evidence from various 
reports is mixed and further research is needed. 
List-Level Proportion Congruent 
 So far, this review has focused primarily on item-specific proportion congruent effects. 
An independent question is whether learning about the proportion congruency of the experiment 
as a whole is possible. This is termed list-level conflict adaptation. The published work so far 
clearly indicates that the bulk of the proportion congruent effect is explainable by item-specific 
learning. In most cases, evidence for list-level PC effects independent of ISPC effects was not 
found (e.g., Blais & Bunge, 2010). There are a few findings, however, that suggest a very small 
contribution of list-level PC might exist (Bugg & Chanani, 2011; Bugg, McDaniel, Scullin, & 
Braver, 2011; Hutchison, 2011). For instance, Hutchison compared items of equal item PC that 
were mixed together with other context items that were either mostly congruent or mostly 
incongruent. In other words, PC was manipulated at the level of the list, but not at the level of the 
items that were being analysed. This procedure produced a list-level proportion congruent effect. 
That is, the Stroop effect was larger in the high PC context relative to the low PC context. A 
similar result was found by Bugg and Chanani using a picture-word Stroop task (i.e., a picture 
target and distracting word). 
 Given such results, one might argue that list-level conflict adaptation is real. Indeed, 
adaptation to conflict across the entire task seems more plausible than adaptation to individual 
items. Furthermore, such a list-level PC effect is impossible to explain in the context of the 
contingency account of PC effects. The critical items being analysed do not vary in contingency 
between the high and low PC contexts. The remaining effect thus must be explainable by a 
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process other than contingency learning. This other process could be conflict adaptation, though 
there are still other possibilities. 
 Temporal learning. Confounds other than contingency learning biases might be present 
in list-level PC experiments such as those of Hutchison (2011) and Bugg and Chanani (2011). 
Work on temporal learning can fill this void. The role of time in learning has a long history in 
both philosophy (e.g., Hume, 1739/1969) and experimental psychology (e.g., Michotte, 
1946/1963) and is arguably just as important as contingencies in learning the relation between 
events. According to the temporal coding hypothesis (Matzel, Held, & Miller, 1988), episodic 
memories of trials include more that just information about the presented stimuli and the 
response that was made; they also contain information about time. As a result of this, participants 
not only learn about what to respond, but also learn when to respond. A classic example of 
temporal learning comes from the literature on mixing costs (for a review, see Los, 1996). For 
instance, Grice and Hunter (1964) present an experiment in which participants press a key when 
they detect a tone that is either high or low intensity. Some participants were only presented with 
one tone intensity (i.e., high or low). In such pure lists, responses were predictably slower to low 
relative to high intensity tones. Other participants received a mix of high and low intensity tones. 
A mixing cost was observed for these mixed lists, in that both high and low intensity tones were 
responded to slower than in pure lists. Importantly, this mixing cost was larger for low intensity 
tones. Grice (1968) argues that participants accept less evidence (i.e., lower threshold) if only 
presented low intensity tones and require a bit more (i.e., higher threshold) if only presented high 
intensity tones. When the two types are mixed, there is more uncertainty and the (experiment-
wide) threshold for responding is set much higher. This produces a small cost for high intensity 
tones and an especially large cost for low intensity tones. Although there are other mechanistic 
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accounts of mixing costs (e.g., Kohfeld, 1968; Ollman & Billington, 1972; Strayer & Kramer 
1994a, 1994b; Van Duren & Sanders, 1988), the general idea in the literature is that participants 
are able to alter when (e.g., after how much evidence) they anticipate being able to respond. 
 Like contingency learning, temporal learning has an adaptive value. For instance, the 
Adaptation to the Statistics of the Environment (ASE) model (Mozer, Kinoshita, & Davis, 2004; 
see also, Kinoshita, Forster, & Mozer, 2008; Kinoshita, Mozer, & Forster, 2011) explains 
temporal learning in terms of the need to balance speed and accuracy (see also, the decision 
model of Mozer, Colagrosso, & Huber, 2002). The threshold will therefore be lower when most 
of the trials can be accurately identified quickly (e.g., high PC), thus allowing for faster 
responses without sacrificing accuracy. However, the threshold will be high when correct 
identification tends to take longer (e.g., low PC), thus coming at a cost to speed in order not to 
inflate errors. Schmidt (2012b) proposes a similar account based on episodic learning, where it is 
assumed that information about response time is encoded in trial episodes. Upon retrieval, this 
temporal information serves to assist in anticipating when a response can be made. By correctly 
anticipating when to respond, participants will be especially fast at responding at the expected 
time. 
 Temporal learning processes such as these can explain list-level PC effects. In the high 
PC context, most of the trials are congruent. Congruent trials are responded to quickly, so the 
high frequency of quick responses will lead participants into a rapid pace of responding to 
congruent trials (e.g., because of an earlier temporal expectancy or a lower threshold), with a 
penalty to the infrequent incongruent trials. Thus, even for contingency-unbiased items, the 
Stroop effect will be large. In contrast, in the low PC context most of the items are incongruent 
and thus participants are slow to respond. Their pace of responding is therefore a bit lax and 
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there is less of a benefit for congruent trials. The result, even for contingency-unbiased items, is 
a reduced Stroop effect. 
 Indeed, work by Kinoshita and colleagues (2011; see also, Kinoshita et al., 2008) 
demonstrated that the PC effect in masked priming is strongly determined by previous response 
times. The argument, based on the ASE account, was that previous response times will have been 
much faster on average in the high PC condition relative to the low PC condition. When previous 
response times were faster, temporal expectancy will also be faster and the threshold for 
responding will be lower. Previous trial response times can therefore serve as a proxy for 
temporal expectancy. The prediction then is that as previous response times speed up the 
congruency effect will get larger. This is because faster trials are more affected by a threshold 
shift than slower trials (e.g., Kinoshita & Lupker, 2003), meaning that the benefit for congruent 
trials relative to incongruent trials will be larger the faster the temporal expectancy. Indeed, 
previous response time and congruency were found to interact in just this way, independent of 
the PC factor. This shows that the different temporal expectancies in the high and low PC 
conditions are a source of bias in estimating conflict adaptation. Although the PC effect was not 
eliminated entirely by controlling for previous response time, previous response time can only be 
regarded as a weak proxy of temporal expectancy (e.g., participants inevitably account for more 
trials than just the most recent one). As a result, deconfounding temporal expectancy and conflict 
adaptation is a tricky enterprise. Conflict adaptation may still play a role, but this is difficult to 
determine with current methods, thus leaving room for future research. 
 Although the work of Kinoshita and colleagues (2011) was focused on the PC effect as a 
whole (rather than the list-level PC effect in particular) it lends further credence to the suggestion 
that temporal learning plays a sizeable role in PC paradigms. In other words, temporal learning 
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represents a powerful confound that will contaminate list-level PC experiments and produce a 
list-level effect even for contingency-unbiased items. Indeed, forthcoming work by Schmidt 
(2012b) demonstrates the same effect of previous response times on the list-level PC effect in 
Hutchison’s (2011) data. Thus, the list-level PC effect, like the ISPC effect, is explainable in 
terms of simple learning biases. However, it still remains unclear whether the entire list-level PC 
effect is due to temporal learning or whether part of the effect is explainable by conflict 
adaptation. 
 Note that the temporal learning account is not circular and the relation between 
congruency and response speed is only indirect. Congruent trials are responded to faster than 
incongruent trials because of a difference in conflict, but it is the response speed, and not 
congruency per se, that determines the temporal expectancy. The conflict adaptation account 
assumes that participants adapt to conflict, whereas the temporal learning account assumes that 
participants adapt to time-on-task. In the context of a conflict paradigm, time-on-task is only 
incidentally related to conflict. This is a subtle distinction, but an important one. One key 
difference is that the temporal learning account suggests that participants should be capable of 
learning time-on-task information even when something other than conflict (e.g., contrast or 
word frequency) determines time-on-task. It is not clear why a conflict adaptation account should 
make the same prediction, yet such findings are observed frequently in the temporal learning 
literature. For instance, Kinoshita and Lupker (2003) found that the word frequency effect (i.e., 
faster responses to high relative to low frequency words) was larger when preceded by fast 
(quickly identifiable) nonword trials relative to slow nonword or (slow) exception word trials. 
Similarly, Schmidt (2012b) was able to mimic list-level PC effects with non-conflict stimuli 
using a contrast manipulation. When most of the targets were easy (high contrast), the contrast 
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effect (low – high) was larger than when most of the targets were hard (low contrast). There were 
no distracters or conflict to adapt to. Results such as these demonstrate that variation in average 
response time is all that is needed to produce apparent list-level PC effects. Of course, it could 
still be the case that both temporal learning and conflict adaptation contribute to the list-level PC 
effect. The currently published results are ambiguous in this respect. 
Context-Level Proportion Congruent 
 Yet another variant of the PC procedure uses differing contexts to alter proportion 
congruency. For instance, Crump, Gong, and Milliken (2006) presented colour word distracters 
that were followed by colour block targets that appeared at one of two locations (above or below 
fixation). Colour blocks were high PC with the word when presented at one location (e.g., above) 
and low PC when presented at the other location (e.g., below). Words were thus not contingent 
on the response in the task as a whole, but PC differed at the two context locations. The 
congruency effect was larger at the high PC location relative to the low PC location. A similar 
experiment was presented by Bugg, Jacoby, and Toth (2008), in which display font was used as 
the context cue for colour-word Stroop stimuli. Similar to Crump and colleagues, a larger 
congruency effect was found for the high PC font relative to the low PC font. In both types of 
experiment the word was not directly predictive of the response, which might suggest a role for 
conflict adaptation does exist after all. 
 Contingency learning. It could be argued that context-level PC experiments do not 
really rule out contingency learning. While a single distracter (e.g., word) might not be predictive 
of the response on its own, the two distracting dimensions together are. For instance, BLUE and 
the above location predict a blue response, whereas BLUE and the below location predict a red 
response. Thus, compound-cue contingency learning is a definite possibility. Indeed, work on 
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occasion setting indicates that this sort of compound-cue learning does in fact occur in many 
learning environments (for a review, see Holland, 1993). In the context of Crump and colleagues 
(2006), for instance, the location serves as an occasion setter determining what the word predicts. 
However, this multiple-cue account has yet to be tested in a non-conflict variant of these PC 
paradigms. 
 Another limitation on the occasion setting or multiple cue account of context-level PC 
effects is that it cannot explain recent findings by Crump and Milliken (2009). In these 
experiments, the location-specific PC of some context items was manipulated, whereas the 
location-specific PC of other transfer items was not. The context items made it such that one 
location (e.g., above) was high PC, whereas the other location (below) was low PC. The transfer 
items were contingency-unbiased, however. Despite this fact, transfer items produced a PC effect 
(viz., a larger congruency effect at the high relative to low PC location). The contingency 
account is unable to explain such a finding. The results therefore seem to support the notion that 
context-level conflict adaptation can occur under such a scenario. 
 Temporal learning. However, there are several things to note about this very particular 
version of the Stroop task. In a sense, list-level proportion congruency is being manipulated at 
the context (location) level, rather than at the block or subject level. In other words, one location 
is a high list-level PC task and the other is a low list-level PC task. Thus, if (non-conflict) 
learning processes are sensitive to context, then all of the caveats of the list-level PC task equally 
apply to the context-specific version. For instance, the temporal learning bias for the above (high 
PC) location will be for fast responses (thus producing a large congruency effect), whereas the 
temporal learning bias for the below location (low PC) will be for slow responses (thus 
producing a relatively smaller congruency effect). Although this explanation is post hoc, the only 
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assumption that a non-conflict learning account needs to make to explain context-level PC 
effects is that learning biases are sensitive to context (something we already know to be true 
from other work; e.g., Holland, 1993). All the rest of the findings with context-specific 
paradigms directly follow from the learning factors (i.e., contingency and temporal learning) 
already discussed in this review. This includes the transfer effects of Crump and Milliken (2009), 
because there is a context-specific temporal learning bias. Thus, there are non-conflict 
interpretations of PC effects at the item, list, and context levels. 
 A caveat of this context-specific temporal learning idea, however, is that it assumes that 
temporal expectancy is not task-wide, but can instead vary from trial-to-trial depending on 
context. This would mean that participants can jump back and forth between a fast rhythm at the 
high PC location and a slow rhythm at the low PC location. This is certainly plausible, but there 
is currently no evidence that this can, in fact, occur. If temporal learning can only occur at the 
overall task level, then a temporal learning account is unable to explain the transfer effects 
observed by Crump and Milliken (2009). If there are no other learning confounds, then conflict 
adaptation may be the only viable account that remains. Further research on this topic will 
therefore prove highly diagnostic of the explanatory power of the learning account. 
Summary 
 The literature on proportion congruent effects is clearly mixed. The analysis presented 
here suggests that an account based exclusively on learning and memory processes is at least a 
viable competitor to the more popular conflict adaptation theory. However, the collective results 
are ambiguous. Some results suggest that ISPC effects might be explainable exclusively by 
contingency learning confounds, but this has not gone unchallenged. Tentative work on temporal 
learning suggests that list- and context-level effects may also be explainable by non-conflict 
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processes. Especially with regard to context-level effects, however, this view is still highly 
speculative. 
Gratton 
 A second method used to study possible conflict adaptation effects is the Gratton effect. 
The Gratton (or sequential congruency) effect is the observation that congruency effects are 
larger following a congruent relative to an incongruent trial (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
The conflict adaptation account of the Gratton effect is similar to the conflict adaptation account 
of PC effects. Specifically, it is argued that attention to the word is decreased following a 
conflicting incongruent trial. Thus, congruency effects are reduced following a conflict trial. 
Following a congruent trial, however, attention to the word is relatively higher, thus leading to a 
greater impact of the word on performance. 
 There are several versions of the conflict adaptation account as it relates to the Gratton 
effect. Gratton and colleagues (1992) initially proposed an expectancy account, whereby an 
expectation that the congruency of the previous trial will be the same as the congruency of the 
current trial leads to an increase in conflict adaptation following an incongruent trial and a 
decrease following a congruent trial. 
 The conflict monitoring model provides a slightly different interpretation. In addition to 
PC effects, the conflict monitoring model of Botvinick and colleagues (2001; see also, Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008) has successfully simulated the Gratton effect. The model accomplishes this 
because the level of conflict experienced on the most recently encountered trial has the largest 
effect on behaviour on the following trial. Thus, if an incongruent trial was just experienced, the 
conflict monitor will have processed this high level of conflict and the conflict adaptation signal 
will thus be increased during the following trial. The word will resultantly have less of an impact 
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on colour identification and the congruency effect will be reduced. In contrast, if the previous 
trial was congruent the conflict adaptation signal will be weaker. Thus, the word will have a 
larger effect on the following trial and the congruency effect will be increased. 
 A slight variant of the conflict monitoring model is the adaptation by binding account of 
Verguts and Notebaert (2009; see also, Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). According to this account, 
experiencing conflict leads to a strengthening of learning processes. Among other things, 
connections between target stimuli and task demand units are strengthened when conflict is 
experienced. Thus, on the following trial the task demand unit will have a stronger effect on the 
input units, thus reducing interference from the distracting word. The expectancy, conflict 
monitoring, and adaptation by binding accounts propose slightly different mechanisms for 
instantiating conflict adaptation, but have in common the claim that attention to the distracter is 
weakened relative to the target following a conflicting incongruent trial. 
 Binding. Similar to list-, item-, and context-level PC effects, alternative interpretations 
have also been forwarded for the Gratton effect. Most notably, Mayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003; 
see also Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004) pointed to the fact that different types of feature 
repetitions are present in each of the four cells of the Gratton design. For instance, a complete 
repetition occurs when both the word and the colour of the previous trial are repeated on the 
current trial. Such trials are responded to extremely rapidly. Critically, complete repetitions are 
only possible for congruent trials followed by a congruent trial (congruent-congruent; e.g., 
BLUEblue followed by BLUEblue) and incongruent-incongruent trials (e.g., BLUEred followed by 
BLUEred). Such complete repetitions are not possible for congruent-incongruent or incongruent-
congruent trials. When Mayr and colleagues analysed only complete alternation trials, where 
both the word and the colour change (e.g., BLUEred followed by GREENyellow), the Gratton effect 
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was eliminated. Subsequent work has confirmed that removing these stimulus binding biases 
substantially reduces the Gratton effect, but a significant remaining effect is often observed (e.g., 
Akçay & Hazeltine, 2007, 2011; Clayson & Larson, 2011; Funes, Lupiáñez, & Humphreys, 
2010; Van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof, 2010; Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2006). Thus, binding plays a sizeable role, but is clearly not the whole story 
(see Egner, 2007 for a review). A role for conflict adaptation could therefore still exist. 
 An alternative way of controlling for feature repetitions is to use multiple stimuli from a 
category. For instance, Egner, Ely, and Grinband (2010; see also, Egner, 2011; Egner, Etkin, 
Gale, & Hirsch, 2008; Egner & Hirsch, 2005; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006) 
gave participants a two-choice gender task in which they had to decide whether a facial picture 
was male or female. The distracting word “male” or “female” was presented overtop of the 
picture, thus creating congruent trials (i.e., when the picture and word were the same gender) and 
incongruent trials (i.e., when the picture and word were different genders). Different faces were 
always presented from one trial to the next and the case (i.e., upper- or lowercase) of the word 
always varied, thus meaning that the exact stimulus never repeated from one trial to the next. 
This was argued to get around the problem of feature repetitions. 
 Arguably, however, this approach is even more problematic than the standard approach. 
Each response is linked with a category of stimuli. Within each category, female faces match 
each other and male faces match each other. That is, there are specific facial features that define 
a female versus male face. Thus, even at the basic visual feature level there are shared features 
within gender categories. These features repeat when congruency repeats and alternate when 
congruency changes. The same can be said for upper- versus lowercase words of the same 
identity (i.e., upper- and lowercase versions of the same words share many specific visual 
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features in common). As a result of this, 50% of congruent-congruent and incongruent-
incongruent trials are complete repetitions. The remaining 50% of congruent-congruent trials are 
complete alternations. Complete alternations are not possible for any of the three other 
conditions. In short, this two-choice procedure makes feature repetition biases substantially 
worse. Egner and Hirsch (2005) do, however, provide one contrast comparing incongruent-
incongruent trials that are either a complete repetition or a complete “switch” (i.e., where the 
word and picture match the picture and word, respectively, of the previous trial) and no 
advantage was found for complete repetitions. This does provide some evidence against the 
notion that category-level learning might not have occurred. However, this did not represent a 
complete test across all trial types and category-level learning such as this has been observed in 
various learning preparations (e.g. Goschke & Bolte, 2007; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012b). 
Thus, although results with this version of the Gratton paradigm do provide some support for the 
notion the conflict adaptation occurs, these results should probably be interpreted with caution. 
As will be discussed in the following section, these results are also inconsistent with work that 
more convincingly controls for feature repetitions, lending credence to the suggestion that this 
procedure may not be bias-free as intended. 
 Another approach to assessing stimulus repetition confounds was presented by Notebaert 
and Verguts (2007). Instead of deleting all trials except complete alternations, they coded for 
each repetition type (e.g., word repetition, colour repetition, etc.) and calculated a regression. 
Using this approach, a Gratton effect was found to still be present independent of the stimulus 
repetition regressors. The regression approach of Notebaert and Verguts is questionable, 
however, as it implicitly assumes that the various types of feature repetitions (word-word, 
colour-colour, etc.) are additively related to each other and to congruency. This is probably not 
QUESTIONING CONFLICT ADAPTATION 23 
the case and is impossible to adequately control for as most of the potential interrelationships are 
inherently confounded with one another. Indeed, Notebaert and Verguts point to this problem 
themselves in the concluding section of their paper and state that the significant Gratton effect 
they found “should probably not be interpreted as the ultimate proof for conflict adaptation” (p. 
1259). Research currently ongoing in our lab confirms the magnitude of these problems, showing 
that this regression approach misses systematic variance due to feature repetitions (Schmidt & 
De Schryver, 2012). As a result, the measure of conflict adaptation in the Notebaert and Verguts 
regression is still confounded with feature repetition biases. 
 Arguably, deleting all data other than alternation trials (Mayr et al., 2003) is still the 
superior method. One may like to argue that this results in conflict adaptation being assessed 
with only one type of transition (viz., complete alternations), but this is irrelevant: if conflict 
adaptation is a real process, then it should happen on these complete alternations just like any 
other trial. Still, stimulus repetitions do not explain the entire Gratton effect, suggesting a 
possible role for conflict adaptation. 
 Contingency learning. Although stimulus repetitions cannot explain the entire Gratton 
effect, recent work by Schmidt and De Houwer (2011) pointed to further confounds in the 
Gratton paradigm. The most important of these confounds are contingency biases. In past 
experiments that attempted to control for stimulus binding biases, distracters were generally 
presented more often than expected by chance in their congruent colour. The most typical 
procedure, for instance, is to have an equal number of congruent and incongruent trials. Because 
the task must be at least four-choice in order to be able to delete all types of stimulus repetitions, 
50% congruent is well above chance. Said differently, words end up being predictive of their 
congruent response (e.g., BLUE is predictive of a blue response because it is presented in blue 
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most often). Even in non-conflict tasks, any such predictive word-response relationships will be 
rapidly learned by participants (e.g., Schmidt et al., 2007; Schmidt & De Houwer, 2012a, 2012b, 
2012c; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 2010). With such contingency biases in the task, 
congruent trials are high contingency (predictive of the correct response) and incongruent trials 
are low contingency (not predictive). 
 It is known that the contingency effect (low – high contingency trials) is larger following 
a high contingency (in this case, also congruent) trial than following a low contingency (in this 
case, also incongruent) trial (Schmidt et al., 2007). There are several possible reasons for why 
this might occur. Perhaps the most likely explanation is in terms of temporal learning. Following 
a fast response (e.g., on a high contingency trial) participants are prepared for another quick 
response. This provides a benefit if the following trial is also fast (high contingency) and/or a 
cost if the following trial is slow (low contingency). Thus, the contingency effect is increased 
following a high contingency trial. The exact opposite is true following a slow (e.g., low 
contingency) trial. Another slow response is expected, thus conferring a benefit to a slow (low 
contingency) trial and/or a cost to a fast (high contingency) trial. Thus, the contingency effect is 
decreased following a low contingency trial. Other explanations are also possible (see Schmidt & 
De Houwer, 2011 for more on this issue), but the key point is that an interaction between 
contingency on the current and previous trials does occur and contingency biases can therefore 
produce a Gratton effect on their own. Conflict adaptation does not, therefore, have to be 
assumed. Indeed, by presenting distracters equally often with all targets and also controlling for 
feature repetition confounds, Schmidt and De Houwer (2011) eliminated the Gratton effect in 
both Stroop and Eriksen flanker. 
 Subsequent work by Mordkoff (2012) lends further credence to the suggestion of 
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Schmidt and De Houwer (2011) that contingency plays a key role in Gratton effects. Mordkoff 
directly demonstrated that the Gratton effect in a Simon task was present after stimulus repetition 
trims in a contingency-biased task, but not present in a contingency-unbiased task. This 
demonstrates quite clearly that contingency biases, like stimulus repetition biases, must be 
controlled for in Gratton experiments if one means to study conflict adaptation. All distracters 
must be presented equally often with all targets or the experiment is inherently confounded. 
 Unfortunately, almost all instances in which feature repetitions were controlled for, 
contingencies were not (e.g., Akçay & Hazeltine, 2011). This is because the most effective way 
of trimming out feature repetitions is to use a task with four or greater choices and most 
experimenters have favoured a 50:50 congruent:incongruent ratio. While this ratio maximizes the 
even spread of observations over cells in the Gratton design, a contingency bias is introduced 
(i.e., 50% congruent responses is way above chance in a four-choice task). Two-choice tasks are 
generally contingency-unbiased, but there are some concerns for the methods used to account for 
feature repetition biases, as discussed above (e.g., it is impossible to have a complete alternation 
for each of the four cells of a Gratton design with only two alternatives). 
 Expectancy. Expectancy may also play a role in the Gratton effect. As already 
mentioned, the account initially proposed for the Gratton effect by Gratton and colleagues (1992) 
was that participants have an expectancy that congruency will repeat from one trial to the next. 
Specifically, following a congruent trial participants expect another congruent trial. This leads 
participants to allow attention to the word, resulting in increased interference. Following an 
incongruent trial, participants will expect another incongruent trial. This leads participants to 
focus attention on the target (i.e., conflict adaptation), resulting in reduced interference. Note that 
this is still a conflict adaptation account, only one that relies on expectation rather than conflict 
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monitoring or Hebbian learning. Thus, these sorts of expectancies would be consistent with the 
conflict adaptation account. 
 That said, expectancies might take a different form and conflict adaptation might not be 
necessary. A related account was presented by Schmidt and De Houwer (2011), in which they 
argue that the memory encoding processes required during a congruent versus incongruent trial 
are slightly different. For instance, there are two potential responses to encode for an incongruent 
trial, but only one for a congruent trial. When information is available for encoding also changes. 
Thus, the cognitive system has to reconfigure slightly when congruency changes in order to 
encode information that does not match the encoding template of the previous trial. This leads to 
a reconfiguration or congruency switch cost, similar to a task switch cost. When congruency 
repeats, there is an encoding benefit for encoding the same sort of information. These benefits 
and costs will produce a Gratton effect. Following a congruent trial, congruent trials will have a 
benefit and incongruent trials will have a cost, thus increasing the congruency effect. Following 
an incongruent trial, the reverse is true. A similar account could be forwarded based on temporal 
learning alone. When congruency repeats, the temporal expectancy based on the previous trial 
matches the current trial, thus providing a benefit. When congruency switches, the temporal 
expectancy is violated, thus incurring a cost. 
 Note that this encoding account is similar to the expectancy account of Gratton and 
colleagues, only that congruency is incidental: congruency determines expectancies, but 
participants do not adapt attention in response to conflict (i.e., conflict adaptation). Schmidt and 
De Houwer (2011) found some evidence for this sort of expectancy-based effect in the Gratton. 
They separated the type of errors to be expected by the conflict adaptation account (word reading 
errors) from those expected by general encoding costs (random key press errors). There was 
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evidence for an increase in random key press errors following a change in congruency 
(consistent with the encoding account), but no evidence for decreases in word reading errors 
following a conflicting incongruent trial (inconsistent with the conflict adaptation account). Not 
only did these results fail to show any evidence for conflict adaptation, but they point to yet 
another task confound. As a caveat, this was only observed in the errors of one experiment. 
Controlling for contingencies and feature repetitions was sufficient to eliminate the effect in 
response times and the response times and errors of another experiment. Thus, this sort of 
expectancy account can only be regarded as tentatively supported. Also unfortunate, controlling 
for expectancy-based effect such as these can prove even more challenging than other confounds. 
For instance, the method of Schmidt and De Houwer only works for errors. Future research is 
therefore needed in order to better partial out such confounds when attempting to measure 
conflict adaptation. 
Higher-Order Sequence Learning 
 Also interesting is work on higher-order sequence learning. For instance, Durston and 
colleagues (2003) observed an increase in incongruent reaction times the greater the number of 
recently preceding congruent trials. Relatedly, Clayson and Larson (2011) observed a decrease in 
response times for congruent trials the longer the sequence of congruent trials. A similar trend 
was also observed for incongruent trials, with a decrease in reaction times the longer the run of 
incongruent trials. Such findings can be interpreted in terms of conflict adaptation. The more 
congruent trials there are, the more participants rely on the distracting word, thus speeding 
congruent trials, but making for a larger cost for a sudden incongruent trial. With a string of 
incongruent trials, attention is gradually focused more on the target colour, thus reducing the 
interfering effects of the incongruent distracters. 
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 Such results are not, however, inconsistent with the learning view of Gratton effects. As a 
participant’s temporal expectancy speeds up they will be better at congruent trials and worse at 
incongruent trials. As a participant’s expectancy slows down they will be better at incongruent 
trials and worse at congruent trails. Like many other results, the learning view here replicates the 
predictions of conflict adaptation theory because of the similarities between the two accounts. In 
both cases, the argument is that participants alter their behaviour to adapt to what they previously 
experienced. The only difference is that conflict adaptation theory proposes that participants 
adapt to experienced conflict, whereas the learning view says that participants adapt to time-on-
task. This is exactly what makes disentangling conflict adaptation from learning and memory 
biases so challenging. 
Summary 
 The preceding analysis suggests that Gratton effects, like PC effects, may be driven 
exclusively by learning and memory processes. If true, then conflict adaptation is not what drives 
the Gratton effect. It is additionally worth highlighting that stimulus binding and contingency 
learning effects could be regarded as two by-products of the same memory mechanisms. The 
difference is merely that stimulus binding effects represent transitory connections between 
stimuli and responses in memory, whereas contingency learning effects represent memory biases 
accumulated across several bound episodes. A learning and memory account may well prove to 
be a potent alternative account for Gratton effects. However, it should be stressed that, like the 
work on PC effects, evidence against conflict adaptation theory is still sparse and in many cases 
speculative. 
Neuroscience 
 Related to conflict adaptation is the notion of conflict monitoring. Botvinick and 
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colleagues (2001) propose that in order to adapt to conflict the cognitive system has a conflict 
monitoring device to measure how much conflict is being experienced. This monitoring device 
can then signal attentional adaptation. Neuroimaging research has purported to link conflict 
monitoring to the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortext (DLPFC). 
For instance, Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, and Carter (2004) found that the Gratton 
effect correlates with ACC activation. Similarly, Blais and Bunge (2010) found that ACC 
activation was correlated with the ISPC effect. A particularly impressive paper was presented by 
Sheth and colleagues (2012) in which individual neurons in the ACC were found to correlate 
with the level of conflict of items on the current trial and items on the previous trial. Following 
specific lesions to this area the Gratton effect was eliminated. This was interpreted as evidence 
that these ACC neurons are responsible for recording and keeping track of conflict. 
 In neuroimaging work with the PC paradigm, Wilk, Ezekiel, and Morton (2012) further 
showed that areas such as the ACC and DLPFC (in addition to the anterior insula and inferior 
parietal cortex) are sensitive to moment-to-moment changes in conflict. That is, rather than being 
sensitive to the PC of the task as a whole (e.g., due to a stable task set), these areas were sensitive 
the amount of recently experienced conflict. This work used a size congruity paradigm, in which 
participants identified the numerically larger of two digits while ignoring the physical size of the 
digits (incongruent trials being when the numerically larger stimulus is the physically smaller 
stimulus). This work also allows for contingency learning, however, as physical size is predictive 
of the correct response. For instance, in the high PC condition the response corresponding to the 
physically larger stimulus is likely correct (i.e., because the physically larger stimulus is likely 
also the numerically larger). This will benefit congruent trials and impair incongruent trials. In 
the low PC condition the reverse is true: the physically smaller stimulus is likely to be the 
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numerically largest. Resultantly, moment-to-moment changes in conflict also incidentally 
correspond to moment-to-moment changes in contingency strength. 
 Although the linking of brain areas to conflict monitoring and adaptation can be regarded 
as speculative, such work purports to add extra credence to the conflict monitoring and 
adaptation account by suggesting a physiological basis for the account. However, If these brain-
behaviour correlations are meaningful (a point to which I will return to shortly), then such 
correlations could be measuring the very memory biases that non-conflict adaptation accounts 
propose drive the proportion congruent and Gratton paradigms that are used for this brain 
research. Indeed, such areas have already been linked to learning and memory processes (e.g., 
see a review by Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997). For instance, the Kerns and colleagues (2004) 
experiment controlled for binding biases, but was confounded with contingencies. Thus, the 
correlation between the Gratton effect and ACC activation can just as easily be interpreted as 
evidence that contingency learning occurs in the ACC, rather than conflict adaptation. Similarly, 
the individual neuron recording and lesion studies of Sheth and colleagues (2012) could be 
interpreted as evidence that these nodes encode for temporal information, something which is 
directly confounded with conflict (i.e., congruent trials are responded to quickly, whereas 
incongruent trials are responded to slowly). 
 The larger problem, however, is that there is reason to doubt that correlations between 
these paradigms and activation in the ACC and DLPFC are meaningful. Grinband, Savitskaya, 
Wager, Teichert, Ferrera, and Hirsch (2011) observed that activation in the ACC (which is 
highly correlated with the DLPFC) seems to be wholly related to time-on-task, not conflict 
adaptation. In other words, activation in the ACC steadily increases from the moment of stimulus 
onset until a response is made. Independent of response times, it is not sensitive to congruency. 
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This dependence on time-on-task was even observed in a task where no conflict was present, no 
distracters were present, and there was not even a target to identify. Participants simply pressed a 
single key when a stimulus disappeared off the screen. The length of the stimulus presentation 
was correlated with ACC activation. Although this is only preliminary work, these results 
strongly suggest that activation in the ACC is little more than an alternative (and very expensive) 
measure of reaction times. Thus, any effect observed in behaviour (e.g., contingency learning, 
Gratton, PC) will correlate with ACC activation. If true, then such brain data adds little to the 
debate that we did not already know from simpler behavioural measures. Moreover, the fact that 
the ACC correlates with time-on-task is consistent with a temporal learning account. In other 
words, given that the ACC seems to be responsive to temporal information it may play a key role 
in the development of temporal expectancies. This temporal learning account of the ACC is even 
consistent with the finding of a time-on-task correlation during their task that had no distracters, 
conflict, or stimulus identification. 
 Other research with EEG has also been forwarded as neural evidence for conflict 
adaptation. For instance, West and Alain (2000; see also, West & Alain, 1999) found that N450 
negativity over the fronto-central region (argued to be caused by the ACC; e.g., MacDonald, 
Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000) was reduced in a low PC task relative to a high PC task. They 
suggested that this indicates increased conceptual-level suppression when conflict is expected in 
the low PC task. The authors also found that a temporo-parietal slow potential (SP) was reduced 
in the low PC task, which they argue indicates that perceptual level colour processing requires 
stronger activation in order surpass the inhibition in the conceptual system. If West and Alain are 
correct in their interpretation of these EEG patterns, then this would provide clear support for 
conflict adaptation theory. Of course, the usual caveats with neuroimaging work still apply. 
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Correlating a behavioural effect with brain activations may hint at a mechanistic interpretation of 
said brain regions, but alternative interpretations are always possible. As already mentioned in 
the discussion of the fMRI work, it could instead be the case, for instance, that frontal activations 
such as the N450 index temporal expectancy, with a weaker activation in the low PC task 
indicating a slower expectancy. 
 Larson, Kaufman, and Perlstein (2009b) found that N450 negativity was more negative 
for incongruent trials relative to congruent trials, but failed to find a sequential effect. That is, 
there was no decrease in the N450 following an incongruent relative to a congruent trial. 
However, the conflict SP was modified by previous congruency. There is some research to 
indicate, however, that the SP may actually be due to time-on-task rather than conflict (West, 
Jakubek, Wymbs, Perry, & Moore, 2005). This experiment also had a strong contingency bias 
(70% congruent in a three choice task) and only controlled for two types of feature repetitions. 
As already discussed, such confounds make it much harder to know whether learning or conflict 
factors are responsible for any brain activations observed. Furthermore, Larson, Kaufman, and 
Perlstein (2009a; see also, Larson, Farrer, & Clayson, 2011) found that the SP was reduced in 
participants with traumatic brain injuries relative to control participants, despite showing no 
signs of behavioural changes in the size of the Gratton effect. The SP thus seems to be 
dissociable from the behavioural Gratton effect. Interestingly, the authors interpreted the 
impaired SP as evidence for a reduction in conflict adaptation, which seems odd given the lack 
of an effect in behaviour. 
Summary 
 There is a rich literature of EEG, fMRI, and lesion studies linking various brain regions, 
such as the ACC and DLPFC, to conflict monitoring and adaptation processes. As highlighted in 
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this section, however, there are many interpretational problems with such data. First, 
neuroimaging work with healthy participants is inherently correlational. It is therefore difficult to 
know whether the areas that are most active during certain tasks are really performing the 
hypothesized processes or whether such activation differences are more incidental (e.g., a 
response to time-on-task). Even with lesion studies, a further issue is that we currently do not 
know whether impaired behavioural effects are due to impairment of conflict adaptation or to 
impairment of the learning and memory confounds present in the paradigms used. Brain research 
in support of conflict adaptation is nevertheless compelling and more work is therefore required 
to see whether the learning and memory account provides a better explanation. It is important, 
however, to highlight the fact that neuroimaging work can only be regarded as speculative. 
Behavioural data should still probably be relied on most strongly when selecting between 
competing accounts. 
Future Directions 
 Conflict adaptation theory is highly popular in cognitive psychology and this is not 
without reason. It has high explanatory power for a broad range of behavioural and brain data. Of 
course, it is alternatively possible that the findings conflict adaptation theory purports to explain 
are driven by other factors, such as learning and memory biases. This review presented some 
results that tentatively suggest that the alternative view may be correct, in addition to some 
newer ideas that can be regarded as plausible though highly speculative. In this sense, it is not 
entirely clear whether conflict adaptation is an idea that we can abandon or one that still retains 
explanatory power for part of the effects under study. 
 If conflict adaptation is real (whether list-, item-, or context-wide), then there is still a 
benefit to the literature to exploring the hypothesis that it is not. De Houwer (2011; see also De 
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Houwer, 2007) discusses the functional-cognitive view for psychological research. He argues 
that a strictly cognitive approach (i.e., treating behavioural results as proxies for mental 
processes) can impair theorizing by restricting the possible interpretations of results. As De 
Houwer (2011) puts it: “Merely entertaining the idea that a mental construct is a necessary cause 
of a behavioral effect could encourage researchers to ignore evidence that questions this idea” (p. 
203). In the functional approach, behavioural results are defined simply in terms of changes in 
the environment. For instance, the PC effect is not defined as a change in the congruency effect 
due to conflict adaptation, but a change in response time differences due to manipulations of the 
proportion of congruent trials. The functional-cognitive approach combines the two, determining 
the environmental conditions in which an effect is observed (functional) and building mental 
interpretations to fit with this knowledge (cognitive). 
 As applied to the current discussion, by considering the results of a paradigm (e.g., 
Gratton) as a behavioural effect and not assuming that conflict adaptation is the correct mental 
mechanism responsible for it discovery of alternative influences on the data become possible. 
For instance, if one does not assume that the ISPC effect is driven by item-specific conflict 
adaptation, then one can hypothesize about other task influences (e.g., contingencies) that could 
explain the critical ISPC interaction between congruency and item-specific proportion 
congruency. Even if a conflict adaptation effect remains on top of that alternative (contingency) 
effect, we have still learned something new about what and how participants learn. For this 
reason alone, assessing data with the eye of ignoring conflict adaptation as the default mental 
explanation of the data can be a powerful approach to strengthening the literature. 
 That being said, in the current state of the literature it is certainly incorrect to say that 
there is sufficient evidence to abandon conflict adaptation theory as a potential explanation. 
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Future research is still needed to determine how much explanatory power a non-conflict account 
really has. This is particularly true for temporal learning research. While there is some evidence 
that temporal learning might play a role in producing the list-level PC effect, it still remains to be 
determined how much of this effect can be explained by temporal learning. Future work might 
aim to find a way to directly dissociate temporal learning biases from list-level PC. If this could 
be achieved, then it would allow us to assess whether there is a portion of the list-level PC effect 
that cannot be explained by temporal learning. If so, then this would lend credence to the conflict 
adaptation account for list-level effects (though, of course, further biases are still possible). 
 Of even more interest, context-level PC effects call for more scrutiny. This manuscript 
presented the idea that temporal learning might be context dependent. In other words, contextual 
cues (e.g., location) may serve as occasion setters to differing temporal expectancies. This would 
be an interesting finding if it could be demonstrated, but currently this idea is entirely 
speculative. It might, for instance, alternatively be the case that temporal learning biases can only 
occur at a task-wide level and not shift rapidly in response to contextual cues. Further research 
on these possibilities is therefore welcome. In particular, future research might aim to introduce a 
contextual manipulation to the (non-conflict) contrast paradigm of Schmidt (2012b) or the word 
frequency paradigm of Kinoshita and Lupker (2003). For instance, if one location is associated 
with mostly easy (high contrast) items and the other location is associated with mostly hard (low 
contrast) items, then will the contrast effect be larger at the former location relative to the latter? 
 Similarly, future research on transfer effects could prove useful. There is some evidence 
that temporal learning might contribute to list-level PC effects, but it still remains to be 
demonstrated that these temporal expectancies do, in fact, carryover from frequency-biased 
context items to frequency-unbiased transfer items. If such a finding cannot be observed, then 
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this would put a large hole in the claim that context-level PC effects are solely due to temporal 
learning. 
 The role of contingencies in ISPC effects also needs more attention in future research. So 
far, the evidence has been mixed. The new dissociation procedure of Schmidt (in press) provides 
tentative support for the notion that contingencies are the only active variable that we need to 
consider, but this support comes from only one experiment. Future work might therefore aim to 
apply variants of this dissociation procedure to a wider range of experimental preparations to 
determine how much explanatory power the contingency account has. Evidence for conflict 
adaptation may still remain in all or some of the many experimental preparations in one or more 
of the various conflict paradigms. 
Concluding Remarks 
 The overarching goal of this review was to highlight the difficulties faced by conflict 
adaptation accounts. As can be seen, evidence for or against conflict adaptation effects in conflict 
paradigms such as the Stroop is ambiguous. Several results are particularly damaging for the 
conflict adaptation account (e.g., Grinband et al., 2011; Schmidt, in press; Schmidt & De 
Houwer, 2011), but other results provide difficulties for the null hypothesis (e.g., Crump & 
Milliken, 2009). Implicit learning processes exert a powerful impact on performance (Schmidt, 
2012a). Thus, by manipulating proportions and sequential dependencies in PC and Gratton 
paradigms the potential for learning is introduced. We know that participants learn something, of 
course, but whether they can learn anything about conflict is an open question. The most 
rigorous attempts to control for confounds often eliminate the original effect. Thus, if conflict 
adaptation is real, then it might be quite subtle and context-dependent. Whether or not conflict 
adaptation is observable and at what levels it can occur (e.g., list, item, context, sequential, etc.) 
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are still very important questions for the literature that still lack definitive answers. In some 
versions of a given paradigm evidence for conflict adaptation seems strong, whereas in others 
this is less the case. There are caveats with every approach, so the summed results from the 
literature do not tell a clear story. At minimum, it is hoped that this review demonstrates that an 
account that does not appeal to the notion of conflict adaptation is still very viable. 
 The alternative account for PC and Gratton effects is multifaceted, but revolves around 
one central idea. Encoding of previously encountered trials (e.g., into episodic memory) will lead 
to incidental response biases during subsequent retrieval. The most recently encoded trials will 
have a powerful effect in producing sequential modulations, such as feature binding effects 
(Hommel, 1998), negative priming (Rothermund, Wentura, & De Houwer, 2005), and the 
Gratton effect. Averaging over several trials produces contingency learning biases and temporal 
learning biases, which help to explain basic contingency learning effects, mixing costs, a portion 
of the Gratton effect, and PC effects at the item, list, and context levels. In other words, all the 
evidence for conflict adaptation can quite conceivably be explained away by simple memory 
encoding and retrieval processes. The appearance of conflict adaptation could therefore be an 
illusion. Some of the evidence for this null (i.e., non-conflict adaptation) account is based on 
strong experimental support and some on novel post hoc explanations provided in this review. 
Clearly the evidence does not unequivocally support either view and further research is definitely 
called for. However, the hope is that this review has demonstrated that an account based purely 
on learning and memory biases is a viable alternative to an account which additionally assumes 
the presence of conflict monitoring and adaptation processes. 
 One might conceivably object that conflict adaptation is not much different than the 
learning account presented here, because conflict adaptation involves learning as well. However, 
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it is important to note some differences. The non-conflict account only assumes that participants 
learn about when and what to respond. The conflict adaptation account additionally assumes that 
participants are able to learn about the amount of conflict they are experiencing (conflict 
monitoring) and are able to flexibly adjust attention in response to the amount of conflict 
experienced (conflict adaptation). These two processes are not assumed by the non-conflict 
account and are the processes that I wish to question in this review. A more parsimonious 
account that excludes conflict monitoring and adaptation mechanisms may be sufficient. Of 
course, a simpler account is not necessarily the correct account. 
 If conflict adaptation is assumed to be real, however, confounds such as those discussed 
in the current review cannot be ignored. It is never sufficient to simply reference work 
suggesting that conflict adaptation exists after full controls. If the goal is to assess conflict 
adaptation independent of known task confounds, then it is always necessary to control for every 
identified confound in every experiment. This should seem obvious, but it is not common 
practice. For instance, although it has been shown that controlling for feature repetitions sizeably 
reduces the Gratton effect (e.g., Mayr et al., 2003), these biases are not always controlled for. 
Independent of one’s theoretical bent regarding the larger question of whether or not conflict 
adaptation is observable, such confounds must always be attended to. 
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